On 6 March 2018, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ, composed of its president, its vice-president and the presiding judges of five chambers gave its long-expected judgment in the Achmea case. 1 In the proceedings, 16 governments of European Union Member States and the European Commission actively participated, advancing different observations. The Achmea judgment is formulated as a landmark decision on the relationship between the EU judicial system and self-standing investment arbitration. As I will explain in this paper, the consequences of the ECJ's judgment are not confined to the single case at hand. 2 In its 12 pages judgment, the Grand Chamber bluntly rejected the arbitrationfriendly conclusions of AG Wathelet (amounting to 38 pages), and drew a dividing line between investment arbitration and the fundamental competence of the ECJ as the ultimate arbiter in the Internal Market for disputes related to the fundamental freedoms of establishment, cross-border services and the free movement of capital. The judgment largely builds on the 2014 Opinion of the
Court regarding the Draft Agreement on the Accession of the EU to the European Convention of
Human Rights (Opinion 2/13). 3 In this decision the ECJ precluded the transfer of any competences on the interpretation of issues subject to EU law to any adjudicatory body operating outside of the Union. 4 By taking up this line of argument again in Achmea, the Court clearly demonstrated that there is a red line which neither the EU lawmaker itself (as in Opinion 2/13) nor the Member States (as in Achmea)
can breach. Ultimately, Achmea is a political judgment, which must be read from the perspective of European Union law. 
The Arbitration Proceedings and the Challenges of the Award in the German Courts
Firstly, I will briefly summarise the facts of the case and its procedural history. 6 In 2004, the Slovak government opened up its national market to operators offering private sickness insurances. Achmea, an undertaking of a Dutch insurance group, established a subsidiary in Slovakia through which it contributed capital and offered private insurance services on the Slovak market, concluding contracts with clients. In the course of 2006 and 2007, the Slovak government partially reversed its earlier liberalization of the insurance market, ultimately prohibiting the distribution of profits made through private sickness insurances. This ban was successfully challenged in the Slovak Constitutional Court, which held in January 2011 that the prohibition was incompatible with the constitution. In August 2011, a new law permitted again the distribution of profits made from private sickness insurances offered on the Slovak market.
In the meantime (in 2008), Achmea had initiated arbitration proceedings against Slovakia under Article 8 of the Dutch-Czech-Slovakian BIT of 1992. 7 This article provided for the parties to establish the arbitral tribunal within a particular time period, in the absence of which the appointments were to be administered by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Furthermore, it provided that the arbitral tribunal was to determine its own procedure, applying the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. Article 8 further made reference to the applicable law. The arbitral tribunal chose Frankfurt as the place of arbitration and therefore German law applied as the lex arbitri. Slovakia initially objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, arguing that, following its accession to the EU, Article 8, providing for recourse to arbitration, was incompatible with EU law, which was applicable to the dispute at hand.
By an interlocutory award of October 2010, the arbitral tribunal rejected these arguments 8 First, the judgment does not directly respond to the arguments set out in the request for a preliminary reference. As mentioned above, the BGH had expected that the ECJ would state that intra-EU investment arbitration was compatible with Union law. Consequently, the reference had argued in favor of the compatibility. 15 In this respect, the Achmea judgment is unusual, as the ECJ normally takes up at least some parts of the arguments supporting the questions referred to it.
12 BGH 3 March 2016 DE:BGH:2016:030316BIZB2.15.0. Per para 14, the request for a preliminary reference was made in light of the long-standing controversy surrounding the compatibility issue (and the fact that the ECJ had not yet rendered a judgment on it) and the large number of intra-EU BITs that included a similar arbitration clause. 27 It is interesting to note that the concerns of the ECJ (paras 50 ff) regarding the intervention of investment arbitration by courts of EU Member States did not apply to the case at hand as German arbitration law permits a review of the award (s 1059 ZPO). The concerns expressed relate to investment arbitration which operates outside of the NYC without any review of the award by state court, especially in the context of art 54 and 55 ICSID Convention. 34 In Achmea, the Dutch-Czech-Slovakian BIT referred to national law as applicable law (which the AT interpreted as in a way that domestic law also included EU law). However, this approach does not sufficiently respect the autonomy and prevalence of EU law. 35 In this context, art 30(3) VCLT would nevertheless permit to consider EU law as applicable international law between the parties, cf Berman (n 29), 653 ff. See infra text at n 51. consequence that the arbitral tribunal could be considered 'a court of a Member State' in the sense of Article 267 TFEU. As a result, any direct dialogue between a BIT arbitral tribunal and the ECJ in preliminary reference proceedings was excluded.
One might ask whether Achmea is, in this respect, a missed opportunity. On the one hand, the ECJ clearly stated that under Article 8(6) of the BIT, the task of the arbitral tribunal was also to apply EU law when interpreting and resolving disputes arising under the BIT. 39 However, the Court saw a procedural deficiency in ensuring the effective application of EU law, as the arbitral tribunal was not sufficiently integrated in the judicial system of the Member States concerned, so as it allow its decisions to be 'subject to mechanisms capable of ensuring the full effectiveness of the rules of the EU' 40 (Article 19(1) TEU). 41 Furthermore, the ECJ also considered the review by German Courts in the present case as insufficient. In this respect, the ECJ highlighted that the arbitral tribunal (on its own motion) had chosen Frankfurt as the seat of arbitration (paras 52 and 53). It was because of this choice that German and EU law applied as the lex arbitri and that annulment proceedings could be brought before German courts. However, the procedural framework of Article 8 of the Dutch-Czech-Slovakian BIT did not provide for any safeguard that the investment arbitration would take place in an EU Member State (and would be under the residual control of the courts of this Member State). Therefore, the ECJ concluded that the procedural safeguard for the efficient application of EU law was insufficient (para 53).
42
In this respect, the judgment of the ECJ seems to be contradictory: Due to the review proceedings in the German Courts, the ECJ had been invoked under Article 267 TFEU and was able to implement the precedence of EU law in the case at hand. Therefore, the effectiveness of EU law was . 43 The procedural situation in Achmea corresponded to the constellation in Eco Swiss. In both cases, the ECJ was asked in the context of annulment proceedings about the effectiveness of EU law. 44 In this constellation, annulment proceedings cannot directly be based on EU law, but the recognition of the award in the EU might be barred by art V(1)(a) and (2)(b) NYC because mandatory EU law was not respected.
BGH must annul the arbitral award because the underlying dispute resolution system generally does not sufficiently ensure the effectiveness and autonomy of EU law. 45 The issue of whether the arbitral award sufficiently respected the autonomy of EU law (in my opinion: it did not) does not play any role. This is to be regretted. The better approach would have been to strengthen the role of the courts of EU Member States in the annulment and recognition proceedings of investment awards: Here, the insufficient respect for EU law might entail the setting aside or the non-recognition of the award. In these proceedings, the courts of the EU Member States can refer preliminary questions to the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU. However, with regard to intra-EU BITs, the ECJ went further and held that investment arbitration in this constellation is generally incompatible with the autonomy of EU law.
2.3. Achmea and Pending Arbitration Proceedings , paras 188-93, the AT addressed art 59 VCLT only in a comparison between the substantive guarantees and not with regard to the agreed dispute resolution mechanism. In the award on the merits, EU law was not applied, see supra n 10.
47 Art 59 VCLT reads as follows: '(1) A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter and: (a) It appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty; or (b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time. 56 Art 54 and 55 ICSID-Convention provide for the direct enforcement of the award without any recognition procedure (where the award might be reviewed for major procedural and substantial shortcomings), von Papp (n 1), 1058 ff. 57 In this constellation a 'bypassing' of the residual control of EU Member States' courts is more difficult, von Papp (n 1), 1061 f.
Achmea. 58 Of course, arbitral tribunals might simply ignore this argument by declaring a defence based on EU law to be as unimportant as a defence based on domestic law of the defendant state.
59
However, the lex posterior clause in Article 30(3) VCLT provides the hinge to reconsider Article 344 TFEU even from the public international law perspective. Further, arbitrators are not only expected, but also under the legal obligation, to render an award which is capable of being recognised and enforced. As long as arbitral awards need recognition in order to be enforced, arbitrators cannot simply disregard the changed situation following Achmea.
The Situation of ICSID Proceedings
The 
The Energy Charter Treaty
The consequences of the Achmea judgment for the ECT 63 are most problematic. The ECT was concluded as a mixed agreement by the EU and the EU Member States with third states (mainly states belonging to the former Soviet Union and its former allies). Its aim is to guarantee a free market and free access to energy in Europe and Central Asia by creating a kind of European Energy Community.
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The ECT provides for a Chapter on Investment Protection in the energy sector which largely provides for the typical guarantees in BITs. 65 However, it does not contain a disconnection clause for intra-EU disputes. 66 Despite the Commission's efforts to argue in favor of the existence of an 'implicit disconnection clause', it is hard to deny that the ECT does create an intra-EU framework for the protection of investments in the energy sectors. 64 Kleinheisterkamp (n 1), 86 ff. 'The Treaty's provisions focus on four broad areas: (1) the protection of foreign investments, based on the extension of national treatment, or most-favoured nation treatment (whichever is more favourable) and protection against key non-commercial risks; (2) non-discriminatory conditions for trade in energy materials, products and energy-related equipment based on WTO rules, and provisions to ensure reliable cross-border energy transit flows through pipelines, grids and other means of transportation; (3) the resolution of disputes between participating states, and -in the case of investments -between investors and host states; (4) the promotion of energy efficiency, and attempts to minimise the environmental impact of energy production and use.' <https://energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-charter-treaty/> accessed 29 March 2018. 65 Kleinheisterkamp (n 1), 89 ff (listing 'examples of conflicts between EU law and BIT provisions'). 66 By such a clause, intra-EU investment disputes are excluded from the scope of the dispute clause of the international convention. 67 Art 26 ECT reads as follows: '(4) In the event that an Investor chooses to submit the dispute for resolution under subparagraph (2)(c), the Investor shall further provide its consent in writing for the dispute to be submitted to: 82 See supra text at n 69. 83 Leikin and Maniarelli (n 68). 84 In the context of the VCLT, the lex specialis rule is applicable, see eg art 54 VCLT. As a way out of this predicament, Achmea might also be read as a roadmap for the integration of an international investment court (as foreseen by the CETA and the TTIP 91 ) into the framework of Article 19 TEU and 267 TFEU. 92 Both proposals provide for the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration. Eventually, such a permanent court might qualify as a court in the sense of these provisions and the international investment agreement (IIA) might even clarify the point. The ECJ would therefore take supremacy in interpreting the IIA with regard to EU law. However, the inclusion of such a provision in the IIA does not only depend on the willingness of the EU, but also on the consent of the other contracting party.
Brexit: Dispute Settlement Provisions in the Withdrawal Agreement
Finally, the Achmea judgment is also relevant for the Brexit negotiations, and in particular for the dispute settlement mechanism to be included in the future Withdrawal Agreement with the UK. As a starting point, there is no doubt that EU law will be potentially applicable here, so in this sense the Brexit scenario is even less dubious than the one of intra-EU BITs. Notoriously, the UK wants to escape the jurisdiction of the ECJ. However, from the perspective of EU law, excluding the ECJ seems to be impossible.
Against this background, the EU Commission's proposal for a Withdrawal Agreement goes in a very different direction. The mechanism proposed by the Commission seems to be in line with the Achmea judgment, preserving the supervisory role of the ECJ. However, it seems to be of course very unlikely that the UK would accept it. In this sense, the Achmea judgment sets again a red line which the European Council has taken up: Before the text of the draft Withdrawal Agreement is tweaked and modified in the negotiations, the Court warns that its marginalisation may be not only undesirable, but also unlawful.
Moreover, it is to be expected that the ECJ will be asked under Article 218(11) TFEU about the compatibility of the Withdrawal Agreement with Union law before the Agreement enters into force.
Concluding Remark
The ECJ is and remains the guardian of the autonomy of European Union law -not only within the EU, but also with regard to third states. The Achmea judgment does not leave any doubts on the role and the self-understanding of the Court in this respect. Therefore, Achmea must be read through the lenses of European law -as a clear statement that the ECJ does not tolerate any deviation from its role as the final arbiter on matters of EU law.
The consequences for a couple of questions that arise under BITs, the ECT and future investment agreements are clear: EU Member States are not permitted to conclude investment treaties among themselves. Only a court that is sufficiently integrated in the judicial system of the EU Member States, for which Article 8 of the Dutch-Czech-Slovakian BIT was deemed not to provide, may reference a preliminary question to the ECJ. This will be a crucial aspect for future international investment agreements as well as an international investment court system.
From the ECJ's perspective, international investment law must respect the autonomy of Union law. In this respect, it is expected that the case law of investment arbitral tribunals will change to some extent. Frankly spoken, one has to go one step further -international arbitral tribunals should reconsider their attitude to European law. This is a battle they cannot win -and if they try to circumvent the political and legal realities, investment arbitration as a whole might be ruptured.
